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20 Aug. 1951

25X1A9a

MEMORANDUM TO [redacted]

FROM: [redacted] 25X1A9a

SUBJECT: Staff Planning Project No. 26

SUBJECT OF THIS MEMO: Probable International Communist policies through Mid-1953

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AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 13 June 81 REVIEWER: 018557

THE NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

1. The international Communist movement whose overt, covert and Front organizations are directed by the Kremlin, will not and cannot change, by Mid-1953, its basic objective, namely the achievement of world revolution with the resulting establishment of Communist Party rule throughout the world, under the domination of the Communist Party of the USSR.

2. Nor is the international Communist movement's view of the world situation likely to change, based, as it is, upon the theses of "scientific" Marxism and its Leninist-Stalinist interpretation. What may appear to be changes, through Mid-1953 or at any time thereafter, are merely tactical maneuvers, or the introduction of different methods of political warfare, for the sole purpose of expediency.

Like all totalitarian movements, Communism derives its "moral"

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strength from its political "scriptures"; Soviet foreign policy - even though it may at times seem to be expanded Czarist imperialism - is motivated by this ideology and therefore should not be measured with the yardstick of conventional concepts of international relations.

COMMUNIST TIMING

3. The international Communist movement has no "time table" in the Western sense but its leaders time their decisions opportunistically. Opportunities are expected to arise by "historical necessity." However, while direction and end of historical developments are predictable, the length of time and the nature of such developments are not predictable. ("It is impossible to have a plan completed in advance." Lenin) Consequently, it must be presumed that the Communist world leadership is willing to bide its time indefinitely. However, while the next few years will see no change in basic Communist policies, except in the event of a collapse of the Soviet system, the tactics to be used are likely to change frequently and perhaps even radically. (Cf. No. 7) The nature of such changes in tactics or methodology through Mid-1953 cannot be accurately predicted except in terms

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referred to below.

PRESENT COMMUNIST STRATEGY

4. Present Communist strategy may be outlined as follows:

(a) to develop the Eastern European orbit under the leadership of the USSR into a highly integrated amd productive economic unit which could match the power of the West;

(b) To expand Communist power in Asia, thereby "striking at the rear of capitalism" by destroying or whittling down its colonial domination and weakening its strategic position;

(c) to organize subversion in the Near and Middle East in order to create a maximum of political and economic disturbance, thereby weakening the Western strategic position and economic resources;

(d) to keep Western Communism on the "minimum program" of hampering the economic and political stability of the free world, create obstruction against the rearmament program and exploiting and creating anti-war sentiment without, however, incurring the risk of being driven underground at this time.

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This strategy is not likely to be changed through Mid-1953 because:

(a) There is no indication that the USSR will relinquish its hold over the Eastern European satellites but much evidence that Soviet domination of EE nations is more and more tantamount to outright incorporation;

(b) The victory of Communism in China has strengthened the Communist position in Asia immeasurably and the Peiping policy program for the conquest of Asia as outlined at the WFTU Conference in November, 1949, is unlikely to be discarded, regardless of the outcome of the Korea negotiations;

(c) Soviet-Communism has been paying increasing attention to the Near East where the political stability has already been weakened by the development of extreme nationalism. Furthermore, the recent resolution of the Helsinki World Peace Committee which referred to the Near East as a focal point of tensions, reflects world Comm. recognition of the area as one rapidly becoming worthy of serious exploitation;

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(d) With the Western position in Western Europe becoming stronger, there is little chance for the Communist to do more than to follow the "moderate" line they have adopted for some time and to concentrate on the "peace" campaign as the best tactic available.

DIFFERENT METHODS IN DIFFERENT AREAS

5. Through Mid-1953, the methods to be used for the implementation of the Communist program will remain decidedly different in Western Europe, the Near East and Asia. Only two contingencies will alter this program: the outbreak of World War III or an attempt by the Kremlin to relax existing tensions in order to lull the West into a sense of false security (See No. 7)

THE PEACE CAMPAIGN

6. The main instrument of political warfare likely to be used through Mid-1953 will remain the "peace" campaign. It primarily aims at:

(a) undermining the moral cohesion of the Atlantic community by impunging the motives behind the Atlantic Pact

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and by concentrating on the horrors of atomic warfare;

(b) weakening the economy of the Western powers and creating labor disturbances directed against the fulfillment of the Marshall Plan and NATO rearmament;

(c) confusing in the minds of men the concepts of genuine peace with peace on Soviet terms, thereby creating the impression that the USSR is the leading power for peace opposed to the warmongering West.

Since Communism in Western Europe is in a relatively weak position, it will not overcommit itself, so long as this situation prevails, and therefore intensify the "peace" campaign incessantly, through Mid-1953. The Kremlin may also have in mind to (a) use the peace partisan movement as a future roof organization for all Front organizations for the purpose of better control and coordination, and (b) prepare the World Peace Council to be a Communist substitute for the UN. However, while these developments may be covertly under way, they are not expected to be actually initiated through Mid-1953.

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RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AS A NEW DEVICE OF COMMUNIST POLITICAL WARFARE?

7. There is a possibility that, before Mid-1953, the Kremlin may stage a tactical about-face and initiate a period of relaxation even though it is doubtful whether sufficient concessions will be made to convince the West of the "sincerity" of the Kremlin's "peaceful" intentions. This contingency, may it be ever so slight, should not catch us napping, and provisions should be made now to counter it and prevent the Western nations from falling into a new Communist trap.

After so many years of following the party line without regard to the reaction of other peoples, even the most fanatical Communists may have come to the conclusion that the free world is now aware of Communist strategems and can no longer be deceived by well-worn tactics and that, therefore, a new set of tactics should be tried. These new tactics would consist of a policy of sweet reasonableness, possibly backed by deeds designed to lull the Congress and the people of the US into a sense of false security and to sow dissemination between the US and its allies.

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So far evidence shows that such gestures were spotty and not unlike previous Soviet-Communist tactical moves. It remains to be seen whether the USSR or China will follow this approach to the extent that actual concessions would be made. While there is as yet no evidence that the USSR is prepared for a "retreat", this possibility cannot be altogether excluded. Should this Communist approach be implemented in a superficial manner, it will be easy to recognize the ruse for what it is. If, however, the USSR should actually decide to retreat from its position and consent to a relaxation of tension - so un-Communistic by nature - then the danger of Communist encroachment will have increased to new heights.

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TO : [redacted]

DATE: 20 Aug. 1951

FROM : [redacted]

SUBJECT: Attached contributions to SPP 26.

I have purposely been somewhat explicit in this hastily drafted paper so as to make it easier for you to pick and chose. Let me know if you need more or an elaboration of any of the paragraphs.

Attached papers

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